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During the last few years, the Americas have been the stage for
intense public debate and various judicial rulings over the scope of
reproductive rights and access to reproductive technology. Yet only as
recently as 2012 and for the first time in its history, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACHR) accepted a case on reproductive
rights: "Artavia Murillo c. Costa Rica." In this case, the Court
considered whether an absolute prohibition on access to in vitro fertility
treatments (IVF) could be compatible with the rights recognized in the
American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR). Costa Rica was the
only country among the ACHR States in which access to IVF has been
explicitly and absolutely prohibited. Among the other Convention
signatories, legislation is not uniform-some countries permit IVF, but
regulate it; while in others, absent any specific regulation, IVF is, in
fact, practiced.
Through its ruling the Court resolved the various debates that had
been circulating both in the legislative arena and in the courts: among
other issues, the Court decided that human embryos are not legal
persons. It also scrutinized whether the right to life is absolute, or
whether, in determined contexts, it should cede before other rights such
as autonomy and privacy, and whether prohibiting access to certain
medical treatments involves a form of discrimination that is prohibited
by the Convention. Because of its important and far-reaching
implications for the exercise of the human rights recognized by the
ACHR, this ruling demands detailed analysis and discussion.
This Article considers the Court's historic decision and the
challenges that ACHR States parties face in developing IVF regulations
that are consistent with the ruling. In Part I, we will focus on the case
background. Part II explains the Court ruling in detail. In Part III, we
shall ask what kinds of regulations to the practice of IVF would be
compatible with the rights recognized in the ACHR. We will especially
focus on the perspective of women's right to health, the right to form
(or abstain from forming) a family and we will consider aspects of the
discussion involving the scope of anonymous donation. By way of
conclusion, in light of the IACHR ruling, in Part IV we will offer some
comments about possible next steps for Convention States Parties.

I. CASE BACKGROUND
Costa Rica authorized and regulated IVF treatment for married
couples in 1995 through Executive Decree No. 24029-S issued by the
Ministry of Health. Almost immediately, this decree was legally
challenged as unconstitutional on the grounds that IVF violates the right
to life. In 2000 the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of
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Costa Rica determined the Decree's unconstitutionality, basing this
decision on the interpretation that an embryo constitutes a person and
therefore deserves State protection of its rights. According to the
Constitutional Chamber, IVF technology (including research on the
embryos, cryopreservation and embryo disposal) is not consonant with
human dignity and the right to life. Specifically, the Chamber ruled that
lVF regulation according to the Decree violated article 21 of Costa
Rica's Political Constitution and article 4 of the American Convention
on Human Rights.' This holding led to an absolute ban on IVF in Costa
Rica beginning in 2000.2
A group of claimants appealed the Costa Rican ban through the
Inter-American System of Human Rights. These petitioners argued that
their rights were violated on many different levels, including their right
to private family life, their personal autonomy, their rights to
reproductive and sexual health, their right to enjoy the benefits of
scientific progress, and their right to non-discrimination. The claimants
argued that the absolute ban left infertile couples without any viable
treatment for enabling procreation. An additional harm had ensued for
the couples whose IVF treatment was halted mid-course as a result of
the ban. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR)
responded to the petition in 2010 and concluded that the total
prohibition of IVF-such as the one put into effect in Costa Rica-is
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights. 3
According to the Commission, the ban on access to IVF constituted an
1. Gretel Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report
No. 85/10, (2010),
43, at 9. The position recognizing the legal standing of embryos,
nevertheless, is not common for courts. One decision recognizing their legal status is Davis v.
Davis, which dealt with the divorce of a couple whose embryos had been frozen. The man
refused to consent to the transfer of the embryos to his ex-wife or to any other woman. The trial
judge found in favor of the ex-wife, who argued that an embryo is 'a human being existing as an
embryo, in vitro; see Davis v. Davis, 15 FAM. L. REP. 2097, 2103 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. 1989), cited in
Bernard M. Dickens & Rebecca J. Cook, The Legal Status of in Vitro Embryos, Ill INT. J.
GYNAECOL. OBSTET. 91, 92 (2010) (citing Davis v. Davis, 15 Fam. L. Rep. 2097, 2103 (Tenn.

1989)). Subsequently, the Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed this decision and held that the
law does not consider preembryos as persons. It held that preembryos can be regarded as an
"interim category," having its own rules. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. Rep. 588 (1992).
2. The Chamber also argued that the Decree was unconstitutional because it regulated
rights (i.e., the right to life and human dignity) beyond the scope of Executive Branch powers.
According to the Chamber, issues like IVF, insofar as they affect right to life and human
dignity, require a "formal law" from Congress.
3. Gretel Artavia Murillo, Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 85/10,
43, at 9. Artavia Murillo, Report No. 85/10, 135. All English quotations cited in this Article
are the official translation of the report, available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/
articulos/seriec_257_ing.pdf. For a discussion of the Commission's Report, see Martin Hevia &
Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, The Legal Status of In Vitro Fertilization and the American
Convention on Human Rights, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 51 (2013).
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arbitrary interference by the State and it violated articles 7 and 11 of the
Convention insofar as this restriction was incompatible with the rights
of private and family life.4 The Commission found that infertile women,
as a specific discrete group, were especially affected by the ban, and
therefore, it was discriminatory with regard to these women.
Accordingly, the Commission recommended that Costa Rica lift the
IVF ban and guarantee regulation of IVF treatment in accordance with
articles 11.2, 17.2, and 24 of the ACHR.
In response to the Report, a legislative bill to regulate IVF was
introduced in the Costa Rican Congress.5 The proposed bill would
permit IVF under the condition that all the fertilized eggs from one
cycle be transferred simultaneously into the woman who had produced
them;6 it forbids the reduction of the number or destruction of embryos;7
it imposes a sentence of 1 to 6 years on whoever destroys embryos
while performing IVF.8 The Panamerican Organization of Health (OPS,
Organizaci6n Panamericana de la Salud) criticized this bill because of
the risks to the life and health of the woman due to the possibility of
multiple pregnancies occurring as a result of the simultaneous transfer
of all fertilized eggs in a given cycle. 9 Currently, the Costa Rican
Congress is debating the bill on IVF and there is a high likelihood that it
will be passed.1 0
Because Costa Rica failed to adopt the Commission's
recommendations after three deferments, the case was raised to the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The Commission
recommended that the Court declare Costa Rica internationally
responsible for violating articles 11.2, 17.2 and 24 of the ACHR in
relation to articles 1.1 and 2 of the treaty. In the following, we shall
explain the Court's ruling.

4. GretelArtavia Murillo, Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 85/10,
111, 135-36.
5. Proyecto de Ley sobre Fecundaci6n In Vitro y Transferencia Embrionaria [In Vitro
Fertilization and Embrionic Trasnfer Bill], Expediente 17.900 [17.900], Oct. 22, 2010.
6. Id. art. 8.
7. Id.
8. Id. art. 19.
9. Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, 84 (Nov. 28, 2012).
10. Id.
28-37; Recomiendan debate profundo sobre Fecundacidn In Vitro en Costa
Rica, ROTATIVO.COM.MX, http://www.Rotativo.com.mx/vidalsalud/35349-recomiendandebate-profundo-sobre-fecundacion-in-vitro-en-costa-rical (last visited Aug. 5, 2013).
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II. THE IAHR COURT'S RULING
A. Are Pre-ImplantEmbryos Personsfor the
Purposesof the Convention?
The Constitutional Chamber's original ruling that led to the total IVF
prohibition had been based on its interpretation of the "right to life"
guaranteed in article 4.1 of the Convention. Subsequently, the State of
Costa Rica also offered additional arguments defending that
interpretation before the IAHR Court. Given its charge as the final
interpreter of the Convention, the Court considered that a thorough
analysis of the scope of this Article was called for." Moreover, until
this point, the Court had never analyzed the extent of the right to life
from the perspective of sexual and reproductive rights in the context of
the controversy around defining when life commences.
The Court has consistently interpreted article 4.1 of the Convention
as protecting the right to life "in general, from the moment of
conception;" this interpretation is complemented by article 1.2
establishing that "person" means "every human being." Following its
own case law, the Court held that both of these articles needed to be
interpreted and understood in "good faith," based on the four principles
of interpreting legal texts: (1) the ordinary meaning of the terms, (2) the
systematic and historical interpretation, (3) the evolutive interpretation
and (4) the interpretation based on the object and purpose of the treaty.
We shall treat to each of these in turn.
B. The OrdinaryMeaning of the Terms
According to the ruling, the notion of "conception" held by the
Convention's authors, never contemplated IVF because this technology
did not exist at the time that the Convention was drafted. Hence, the
Court offers the two modes for interpreting "conception" from scientific
and legal literature: on the one hand "conception" can mean the moment
of "fertilization of the egg by the spermatozoid," on the other, it has
been
11. Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257,1143, 66-67.
12. Id. T 172, 173. Although the majority vote does not mention this explicitly, the
source for interpreting the text in this way stems from articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. The dissenting vote of Judge Vio Grosso does expressly
mention this, albeit adopting another interpretation of article 4.1. For a discussion of the relative
weight of each of these principles in the decision of the Court, see Eduardo Rivera L6pez,
Conception, Fertilization, and the Beginning of Human Life: Bioethical Reflections on the
"Artavia Murillo" Decision (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors). Rivera L6pez
argues that the main argument is the "meaning of terms" argument; in his view, the other three
arguments do not actually play an important role in the Court's decision.
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interpreted as the moment "when the fertilized egg is implanted in the
uterus."' 3
From the outset, the judges recognized that "this is a question that
has been assessed in different ways from a biological, medical, ethical,
moral, philosophical and religious perspective, and it concurs with
domestic and international courts that there is no one agreed definition
of the beginning of life."' 4 Nevertheless, the Court believes that some
conceptions confer "certain metaphysical attributes on embryos"' 5 and
hence, one conception cannot take prevalence over others, because "this
would imply imposing specific types of beliefs on others who do not

share them."l 6
Given this ideological context and considering that, although
fertilization implies the existence of a different cell, without
implantation the embryo cannot develop, the majority adopted the
second interpretation: it sustains that "conception" in article 4.1 cannot
not be understood as other than signifying from the moment of
implantation.' 7 Moreover, regarding "in general," the judges held that a
literal interpretation must mean that the very wording of the article
foresees exceptions to the rule-even though it does not make the scope
of these exceptions explicit.' 8
It is important to mention that the dissenting opinion adopts a
different interpretation of article 4.1. First, the minority understands
article 4.1 as protecting the already extant life of this "person" or
"human being" and not the interests of other parties (such as might be
the case for couples that recur to IVF). In order to determine who is a
rights holder, the minority looks to articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties and article 1.2 of the American
Convention. On the basis of these, the dissent holds that "person" means
every "human being" according to the American Convention.
Additionally, when article 4.1 states "from the moment of
conception," the minority understands this to mean that the protection
afforded should be "common" to those born and not born.
Consequently, the minority holds that there remains no distinction
between these two groups because both constitute "a totality," that is, in
both the born and unborn human life is present. Hence the born and
unborn are human beings, persons.19
13. Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257,
14. Id. 1 185.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. 1 186-87.
18. Id.1188,at7&12.
19. Id. at 9.
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Secondly, regarding the expressions "law," "in general," and
"conception," the dissenting opinion interprets "law" in the manner
prescribed by the Convention: broadly. Hence, "law" should be
understood as a legal rule-whether constitutional, legal, or
regulatory-dictated by the competent state authority that regulates the
conduct or activities of the inhabitants. 20 Given this, the minority
considers the Costa Rican absolute prohibition on IVF to be consonant
with article 4.1 of the Convention because of article 21 of the Costa
Rican State Political Constitution declaring human life as inviolable as
is the Constitutional Chamber's ruling declaring the unconstitutionality
of Executive Decree No. 24029-S as well. Moreover, according to the
dissent, the American Convention does not grant the expression "and in
general" any "special meaning," and consequently, interpretative rules
like the "ordinary meaning" of the expression, the "context of the
terms," and the "object and purpose" of the treaty are applicable.2 1
These interpretative devices allow the minority to sustain that the "and,
in general" alludes to the moment of the onset of states' obligation to
protect life, that is from the "person's" conception. At the same time,
the minority considers this interpretation to be the one most faithful to
the "object and purpose" of article 4.1-to pursue the objective of
respecting the life of the rights holder. The minority goes on to
emphasize that the expression "and, in general" makes no explicit
reference to exceptions or exclusions; consequently, this is a reason for
considering that the State has an obligation to protect the life of the
unborn from its "conception." 22 Finally, in order to interpret the term
"conception," the dissent claims that the American Convention does not
endow the term with a "special meaning." So, it considers that the rule
of the "ordinary meaning" of the expression should be applied.2 3
Accordingly, the minority interprets the term "conception" on the basis
of the meaning that was ordinary when the Convention was signed in
1969. Hence it turns to the Royal Spanish Academy dictionaries from
1956 and 1970 to determine that the "ordinary meaning" of
"conception" referred to "fertilization." 24 Therefore, the dissent
considers that to attribute another interpretation to "conception," as the
majority does, does not reflect the "ordinary meaning" or the will of the

20. The Word "Laws" (Art. 30 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory
Opinion OC-6/86, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 6 (May 9, 1986); Arlavia Murrillo, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, 1180, at 6-7 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi).
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 9.
24. Id. at 8, 11.
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States Parties to the ACHR because had they desired any other
meaning, this would have been explicitly specified.2 5
C. The Systematic and HistoricalInterpretation
The systematic interpretation holds that legal norms "should be
interpreted as part of a whole, the meaning and scope of which must be
defined based on the legal system to which they belong." 26 In this way,
human rights norms, such as article 4.1, must be interpreted taking
international human rights law into account (i.e., considering other
treaties, laws, and jurisprudence that interpret them). Therefore, the
Court analyzed whether the Inter-American, Universal, European, and
African systems require the absolute protection of prenatal life.
Using a historical interpretation of the Inter-American system, based
on evidence from the preparatory work on the Convention, the Court
concluded that attempts to eliminate the expressions "in general" and
"in general from the moment of conception" from article 4.1 both
failed.27 With respect to a systematic interpretation, the Court concluded
that both the ACHR and the American Declaration use the expression
"every person" in many articles. Nevertheless this does not allow for the
conclusion that embryos are the holders of the rights mentioned in those
articles. Moreover, the Court held that when article 4.1 makes reference
to the protection of life "in general," in fact, the object of this protection
is the pregnant woman, who deserves special attention during and after
giving birth.2 8
The dissent reaches a very different conclusion. It considers that the
majority erroneously applies article 31.4 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties in order to sustain that "conception" should be
interpreted according to the special meaning of the term. 29 For the
minority in order to interpret article 4.1 by the "special meaning of the
term," the meaning sought must be recorded in some agreement,
instrument, or practice, or else demonstrably be a norm of international
25. Id. at 9-12. Rivera L6pez argues that, although the ruling is right to say that embryos
are not "persons," the reasoning of the Court is wrong. He claims that "conception" is a vague
term, and that there are no available arguments to understand that term specifically as either
"implantation" or as "fertilization." Rivera L6pez explains that the Court is wrong to claim that
there is scientific disagreement about the meaning of the term because, actually, "conception" is
not a scientific term. Furthermore, science is clear about what actually occurs at each stage of
embryonic development. The discussion should have been a normative discussion about whether
ascribing rights to human embryos can be justified or not. See L6pez, supra note 12.
191-244.
26. Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257,
27. Id. 1221-23.
28. Id. 222. This is established in article 15.3 of the San Salvador Protocol and article
VII of the American Declaration.
29. Id. at 15, 20.
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law applicable to the relations between the States parties. In this way,
for the dissent, the majority opinion never meets these requirements; the
allusion to different regional instruments in human rights, such as the
domestic case law of the seven States is not sufficient for considering
"implantation" present in instruments or agreements between States for
the purposes of the ACHR.3 0 Finally, these instruments are likewise not
a part of customary international law or general principles because they
cannot be inferred or logically deduced from an international legal
structure. Therefore, the various regional instruments and comparative
case law cannot be applied to the case because they do not establish
formal commitments by the States parties to the Convention.31
D. The Evolutive Interpretation
According to the evolutive interpretation, "human rights treaties are
living instruments, whose interpretation must keep abreast of the
passage of time and current living conditions." 32 In order to do so, the
majority opinion uses comparative law-that is, norms and
jurisprudence from internal as well as international tribunals such as the
European Court of Human Rights. Such an interpretation is especially
important in this case because IVF technology did not exist when article
4.1 was drafted. 3 In the first place, the Court focused on the legal
treatment of the embryo in different jurisdictions, especially in
jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In
Vo v. France, the European Court ruled "the potentiality of the embryo
and its capacity to become a person requires a protection in the name of
human dignity, without making it a 'person' with the 'right to life."' 34
In 2011, although it considered that the European Convention on
Human Rights allowed Austria to prohibit IVF with eggs and sperm
donated by third parties, in S.H. et al. v. Austria, the court found that
"the Austrian legislature has not completely ruled out artificial
procreation [. . .] The legislature tried to reconcile the wish to make

medically assisted procreation available and the existing unease among
large sections of society as to the role and possibilities of modern
reproductive medicine, which raises issues of a morally and ethically
sensitive nature." 35 Finally, in Costa v. Italy, the European Court cited
the Supreme Court of Ireland, which found that embryos obtained from
lVF procedures were not subjects protected by the right to life of the
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 21.
Id. at 16 (Grossi, J., dissenting).
Id. 1245.
Id. T 246.
Id. 247.
Id. 251.
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unborn child recognized by the Irish Constitution. 36 The trend in
international law, therefore, is non-recognition of a right to life of the
un-implanted embryo.
With respect to other regional countries, in some where IVF remains
unregulated, it does occur in practice. While in others, there are laws
that regulate some aspects of the procedure. In Mexico, for example,
federal law permits assisted reproduction only in cases of sterility that
cannot be resolved by other means.3 7 Peruvian law recognizes the right
to undergo IVF, where the gestating mother and the genetic mother are
the same person. 38 Chile prohibits the procedure for ends other than
human reproduction.3 9 In Brazil, the number of eggs allowed for
transfer cannot exceed four. 40
By contrast, the dissent rejects the argument based on comparative
law because only eleven of the twenty four States parties to the
American Convention practice assisted human reproduction; in the
minority's view, this deficiency is compounded by the fact that the
majority does not offer evidence that those States permitting assisted
reproduction do so applying article 4.1.41
E. The Principleof the Most FavorableInterpretation,and the Object
andPurpose of the Treaty
The Court held that article 4.1 seeks to protect the right to life in a
way that is compatible with other rights safeguarded by the ACHR.
Hence, the purpose of the phrase "in general" in article 4.1 is to allow
for the fact that the right to life may cede before other rights that, in
determined circumstances, may hold greater weight. The Court accepted
that the right to life is not absolute.4 2 Therefore, Costa Rica's argument
about the "broadest protection" of the rights to life in its internal law is
inadmissible: the principle of the "most favorable interpretation"
36. Id. 252; see Reglamento de la Ley General de Salud en materia de Investigaci6n
para la Salud, [Guidelines to the GeneralHealth Law on Health Research], art. 56, Secretaria de
la Salud, Jan. 6, 1987 (MiX) [hereinafter Guidelines to the General Health Law on Health
Research].
37. Guidelines to the GeneralHealthLaw on HealthResearch, supra note 36.
38. Law No. 26842, [Ley Generalde Salud], July 9, 1997, art. 7 (1997).
39. Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, 255.
40. Id. (holding that given the fact that all the countries in which IVF is permitted are
States parties to the American Convention, their authorities interpret that such permissibility is
compatible with article 4.1 of the ACHR).
41. Id. 1258, 263, at 18 (Grossi, J., dissenting).
42. Id. 259 ("this approach denies the existence of rights that may be the object of
disproportionate restrictions owing to the defense of the absolute protection of the right to life,
which would be contrary to the protection of human rights, an aspect that constitutes the object
and purpose of the treaty").
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requires that internal law not restrict the exercise of rights recognized in
the ACHR beyond those restrictions already explicitly enumerated
therein.4 3 The Court raises examples of decisions that achieve a balance
of rights and that serve as a reference for interpreting the phrase "in
general, from the moment of conception."" For instance, the Supreme
Court of Justice of Argentina has declared that criminal laws that permit
abortion under certain circumstances are compatible with the ACHR
and the American Declaration.4 5
By contrast, the minority finds that the majority falls into a
contradiction. This is because the majority had already stated that article
4.1 (as used in existing jurisprudence) could not be applied to the case
since it dealt with reproductive rights, which differed factually from the
Court's cases previously decided under this Article.4 6 Nevertheless,
notes the dissent, the construction of article 4.1 is used to conclude that
among the rights and interests in conflict, an "adequate balance" 47 must
exist.
After analyzing article 4.1 from the four above-mentioned
perspectives, the Court concluded that the embryo is not a "person," and
that "conception" must be understood as "implantation in the uterus,"
and that the protection of the right to life is not absolute, but rather must
be balanced against other rights recognized by the ACHR.
III. DOES THE ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION OF IVF PROCEDURES
VIOLATE THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY?

The LAHR Court considered whether the absolute prohibition of IVF
procedures involves the violation of other rights according to the
principle of proportionality. In order to evaluate whether this restriction
pursues a legitimate purpose and complies with the requirements of
proportionality, the Court considered (1) the severity of the interference
on privacy and family rights, (2) whether this severity entailed a
disproportional impact for disability, gender, or socioeconomic
situation, and (3) the dispute over the alleged loss of embryos.4 8

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

260.
262, at 19 (Grossi, J., dissenting).
$ 264, 276.
277.
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A. The Severity of the Limitation of the ContradictoryRights
Involved the Case
The Court notes that the decision taken by the Constitutional
Chamber impacted the right to privacy and family life, and restricted
personal autonomy and reproductive rights. This is because it impeded
individuals or couples from choosing IVF as a treatment for achieving
procreation.4 9 In turn, the absolute prohibition also limits the only
possibility of reproduction for individuals or couples suffering from
infertility.
Nevertheless, the Court also concluded that the prohibition against
IVF impacted the right to privacy, affected the life project and the
psychological well-being of individuals and couples. For example, the
Court showed that the petitioners would have to take abrupt absences
from work in order to undergo fertility treatments abroad, an additional
complication that led to the violation of their privacy.50 Secondly, the
prohibition affected the personal autonomy and life plans of infertile
individuals or couples by impeding their only medical means for
procreation.5 1 Finally, the court concluded that the prohibition affected
the psychological wellbeing of those impacted by it because the
impossibility of procreating resulted in family conflict and depression
for these individuals and couples. 52
B. The Severity of the Restriction Because of the Indirect
DiscriminationCaused by the ConstitutionalChamber's Ruling
The court analyzed whether the interference with rights resulted in
discrimination. The Inter-American Court noted that the ACHR does
not prohibit all differentiating treatment, hence preliminarily, the court
focused on the task of analyzing whether the interference constituted
"differentiation" or "discrimination."5 3 The court concluded that the
effects of the sentence impacted the protection of the right to privacy
and family life, and not the application or interpretation of a specific
law. Consequently, the analysis of the discrimination must be made on
the basis of art. 1.1 of the ACHR-respecting rights-and not of art.
24-equal protection.
The IACHR's case law on art. 1.1 establishes that "States must
abstain from producing discriminatory regulations or those with
discriminatory effects on the different groups of the population when
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. 282-83.
Id. 279.
Id. 281.
Id. T283, 285.
Id.
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exercising their rights." 54 In this way, the Court used the concept of
"indirect discrimination" established by other international human rights
jurisdictions in order to determine the existence of a disproportionate
impact with regard to disability, gender, and the financial situation of
the aggrieved parties.55
First, the Court analyzed whether the ruling had a disproportionate
impact on the disability of the individual or couple. In order to do this,
the Court stated its view that infertility is a disease resulting in the
"failure to achieve a clinical pregnancy" and consequently constitutes a
disability for the persons that suffer from it. 56 In this way, the Court
analyzed the issue on the basis of the rights of disabled persons to
access health services for treatment, enshrined in art. 25.1 of the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The
Court also applied the additional protocol of the American Convention
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (the San Salvador Protocol)
and the Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities (ICEFDPD) to show
that infertility constitutes a physical, mental or sensory impairment, and
that States are obligated to remove existing barriers in order to
guarantee the full exercise of disabled persons' rights and liberties.5 7 In
this framework, the Court declared that States must guarantee special
protections for removing societal obstacles that impede the full exercise
of the rights of persons with disabilities. 58 This, notes the Tribunal,
often requires positive measures on the part of the State to guarantee the
inclusion of persons with disabilities into society.59 Hence, the
Constitutional Chamber's ruling did constitute a disproportional impact
in that it established serious societal barriers and denied the right of
access to the technology necessary to resolve reproductive health
problems in persons with disabilities.

54. Id. 286.
55. Id. (The concept of "disproportional impact" is taken up by the Court through the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights and the Committee on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. See, e.g., H. M. v. Switzerland, Comm. No. 3/2011, CRPD/C/7/D/3/
2011 (Apr. 19, 2012), Hoogendijk v. Holanda, App. No. 58641/00, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2005)).
56. See Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, T 56, 288-89 (To a great extent,
the IAHR Court relies on the definition provided by the World Health Organization (WHO)
which understands infertility to mean an illness of the reproductive system which "[fails] to
achieve a clinical pregnancy after 12 months or more of regular unprotected sexual
intercourse").
57. Id.1290.
58. Id.T291.
59. Id.T293.
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Secondly, the Court analyzed whether the absolute prohibition had a
disproportional impact on infertile men or women with regard to
60
stereotypes and prejudice in society.
Based on WHO and PAHO reports and expert witnesses, the
majority shows that society defines a woman and her femininity through
maternity and fertility. So when a woman is diagnosed with infertility,
this "may be seen as a social disgrace or cause for divorce." 6 ' Such
societal or familial pressures, stemming from the absolute ban on IVF,
add up to the emotional toil for women and leads to a pattern of selfblaming. In this sense, the Court concluded that the Constitutional
Chamber's sentence impedes the woman from overcoming "an
additional burden that increases the self-blame." 62 On the other hand,
society also portrays men's manhood through fertility. Thus, infertile
men affected by the Constitutional Chamber's sentence causes
impotence on them, undermining their gender identity.63
Additionally, the Court makes an analogy to the decision by the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women in
order to establish that the absolute protection of prenatal life derives
from a stereotype that is blind to the disability of some of the affected
women.6 4
For these reasons, the Inter-American Court considered that the
Constitutional Chamber's sentence drew attention to "gender
stereotypes" that violate international human rights law. 65
Finally, the absolute prohibition results in a disproportionate impact
on the socioeconomic condition of infertile couples without sufficient
resources for obtaining treatment abroad.66 The Court concluded that
the absolute prohibition on access to IVF treatment "pushes" infertile
couples into seeking treatment outside the country. 67 Consequently, the
high costs of accessing IVF treatment abroad prevent many infertile

60. Id. 294.
61. Id.
62. Id. 298.
63. Id. 301.
64. Id. at 87-88; see also U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women, L.C. v. Peru, Com. No. 22/2009, § 8.15, Doc. ONU CEDAW/c/50/D/22/2009 (2011)
(deciding that denying surgical intervention because of pregnancy was a decision influenced by
stereotypes that protected the prenatal life over the mother's health). According to the IAHR
Court, the Constitutional Chamber's decision falls into the same stereotyping as that in L.C. by
undervaluing the desirability of the woman. Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
257, at 89.
65. Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 89.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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couples from achieving procreation and realizing their plans for family
life.68
C. The Absolute Prohibitionand Alleged Embryonic Loss
The Court analyzed the Constitutional Chamber's arguments for
prohibiting IVF-in order to avoid "high loss of embryos" 6 9 -and the
purpose of the prohibition-protecting embryonic life against being
discarded, cryopreserved, or lost through failed implantation. 70
Using expert testimony the Court concluded that even natural
pregnancies can result in loss embryos, and consequently, an absolute
prohibition constitutes a disproportional measure for protecting the life
of the embryo.7 1 For example, in natural pregnancy "of every 10
embryos spontaneously generated in the human species, no more than 2
to 3 are able to survive natural selection and be born as a person." 72 In
natural pregnancies, women lose embryos involuntarily, but this is the
result of the natural process of implantation. By contrast, with IVF, in
accordance with each country's regulation, the woman chooses how
many embryos will be generated and how many can be most
conveniently implanted. Consequently, the mother is aware of the
possible loss of embryos.73 Moreover, artificial insemination
technologies, which similarly do not guarantee that every generated egg
will result in a successful pregnancy, are in fact permitted in Costa

Rica. 74

Based on these arguments, the Inter-American Court concluded that
by contemplating the competing rights in the case and the importance of
protecting the embryo, the absolute prohibition violates the rights of
personal integrity, personal freedom, private life, privacy, reproductive
freedom, access to health services, and the right to found a family.75 The
restriction on the exercise of rights creates an especially disproportional
impact in persons or couples who suffer from infertility because of their
disability gender stereotypes and, in some cases, socio-economic
condition that may affect them.
Given the violations resulting from the absolute ban, the Court
ordered Costa Rica to take various measures. Firstly, Costa Rica was
ordered to lift the prohibition so that there would no longer be any
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 89-90.
Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 92-93.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. at 93.
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impediment to IVF access. 76 Secondly, it was to immediately regulate
IVF procedures and infertility treatments with regard to health and in
consonance with duties to guarantee respect for the principle of nondiscrimination.7 7 Finally, the Court also ordered that Costa Rica
compensate the victims for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages.7 8
IV. NEW CHALLENGES FOR IVF AND THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS

The IAHR Court ruling sets new challenges for IVF regulation, and
especially for the protection of women's rights. Yet the Court did not
explicitly address what kinds of regulation would be compatible with
the American Convention, because in the case, it limited its discussion
to the concrete question of whether the absolute prohibition of IVF
constituted a violation of the Convention; the petitioners who sought
access to IVF had never asked about the scope of its permissible
regulation.7 9 In the following Parts, we will discuss what types of
regulation would be compatible with the American Convention.
A. IVF Regulation and the Woman's Right to Health
Among the various possible procedures in TVF treatment, let us
pause first to examine embryonic transfer. This procedure has a wide
range of justifications, from purely scientific ones to others based in
human dignity; some of the interests that inform the regulation stem
from concerns about the woman's health and others for the embryo's
right to life. This spectrum of contending factors makes consistent
regulation a complicated issue. For example, on one hand the American
Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM) recommends the transfer
of no more than two embryos for women with high chances of
pregnancy, and no more than 5 embryos for women whose chances are
low.8 0 This reflects a focus on preventing undesired multiple pregnancy;
hence, such a regulation complies with the protection of the physical
76. Id. at 107.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 101-03 (awarding damages in the amount of $5,000 and $20,000, respectively).
79. The petition presented to the Commission dealt with the absolute prohibition and
consequent violations of rights recognized in the ACHR. The petitioners did not question the
scope of the regulation. Id. at 9-12.
80. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med. & Soc'y for Reprod. Tech., Criteriafor Number of
Embryos to Transfer: A Committee Opinion, 99/1 FERTILrrY & STERILITY 44 (Jan. 2013),

available at http://www.asrm.org/uploadedFiles/ASRMContent/NewsandPublications/Pract
iceGuidelines/Guidelines and MinimumStandards/Guidelinesonnumber of embryos%2
81%29.pdf.
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and mental health of the woman. In contrast to this, we find regulations
like those in force in Costa Rica,8 1 Italy,82 or Germany83 where IVF
regulations require the transfer of all embryos of a treatment cycle into
the woman. These types of regulations seek to protect the potentiality of
the embryo in order to avoid cryopreservation or disposal of embryos,
stemming from a belief that the embryo has a right to life.
Based on the arguments of the IAHR Court and its interpretations of
ACHR rights, including the right to life, regulations of this kind are
incompatible with the ACHR. From the perspective of the right to
health, a regulation that requires the transfer of all the embryos in a
single IVF cycle puts the physical and mental health of the woman at
risk; this, in turn, jeopardizes her exercise of autonomy as well. First,
multiple pregnancy carries with it an increased risk for complications
both for the fetuses and for the woman compared with simple
gestation. Hence, IVF procedures requiring total transfer would have a
dissuasive effect. In turn, such kind of regulations would incur a
violation of the State's obligation under the ACHR to secure health
services that effectively protect the right to life and physical integrity.8 6
Secondly, a duty to transfer all the embryos of one cycle does not
take the individualized nature of IVF treatment into account. IVF
procedures must be specified to the profile of the woman undergoing
treatment, requiring that among other things, the prospective mother's
age be taken into account. The most recent studies in reproductive
medicine advise, as a protective baseline, against transferring all the
embryos of an IVF cycle into the woman. Medical criteria suggest the
transfer of more embryos as the age of the patient undergoing IVF
treatment increases.87 Such a graduation in the number of embryos
transferred would serve to preserve the efficacy of treatment and
achieve procreation, as well as moderate transfer practices so that they
do not potentially harm the patient's right to health.
Additionally, regulation of IVF should contemplate information
programs in order to promote fertility care or awareness about IVF
procedures. Such programs may become especially important for
patients as they age. For example, for patients over 45 years of age that
seek out fertility treatment, health risks as a result of pregnancy increase
81.
82.

Exec. Order No. 24029-S, art. 10 [Costa Rica Executive] [Ministry of Health].
Legge 19 febbraio 2004, n.40, 45 G.U (It.).

83. BORGERLICHEs
GESETZBUCH
EMBRYONENSCHUTZGESETZ 2746 (Ger.).

[BGB]

[Civil

Code],

Dec.

13,

1990,

84. Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, at 89.
85. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med. & Soc'y for Reprod. Tech., supra note 80, at 44.
86. See Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 149, 30 (2006); see
also Albdn-Comejo v. Ecuador, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171, 38 (2007).
87. Am. Soc'y for Reprod. Med. & Soc'y for Reprod. Tech., supra note 80, at 44.
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considerably. Information from several reproductive health centers
reveals that some of the health risks related to pregnancy can involve
serious complications such as hypertension and heart problems, among
others. The potential consequences of trying to become pregnant
under these health risks are important reasons for information programs
to create awareness among those women seeking IVF treatments.
Ovarian stimulation during IVF treatment is another practice with
potentially serious harmful consequences to the pregnant woman that
has thus far been left unregulated. Ovarian stimulation is a procedure
for inducing the ovaries to produce multiple eggs in one menstrual cycle
through hormonal therapies. It can potentially cause women to develop
Ovarian Hyperstimulation Syndrome (OHSS) as a result of being
treated with high levels of hormones. The woman may then undergo
increased vascular permeability, leading to the accumulation of liquid in
the pleural cavity.
Stimulation with high doses of hormones has proven highly
efficacious for IVF treatment. This has been the case in the United
States and the United Kingdom, although in Europe and Japan clinical
procedures have begun to practice IVF using low doses. For instance,
the current data shows that "[w]omen normally generate one egg per
cycle, but high-dose stimulation can help women produce 20 to 30 eggs,
or even more. By contrast, women receiving mild, low-dose IVF
produce 8 to 10 eggs. The ovaries are not suppressed at the outset, and
there is no manipulation of the patient's cycle." 89 There is also evidence
that using high doses of hormones during IVF treatment holds
consequences for the newborns' health as well. Evidence reveals that
newborns conceived through IVF with singleton birth using high doses
of hormonal stimulation display a lower birth weight than naturally
conceived infants. 90 Nevertheless, women or couples may feel financial
pressure to submit to high doses despite the risks, since these may
produce faster results and potentially lower costs because pregnancy can
be achieved in fewer IVF treatment cycles and the cost per cycle is
exorbitant. Finally, forebodingly, drugs may be commonly used for
ovarian stimulation in some countries, even though these have not been
specifically approved for use in IVF treatment. The use of these offlabel drugs in VF treatment tends to have harmful consequences for the
88.

E.g., Age & Fertility,S. CAL. CEN. FOR REPROD. MED., http://www.socalfertility.com/

age-and-fertility/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
89. See Jacqueline Mroz, High Doses ofHormones Faultedin FertilityCare, N.Y. TIMES,
July 16, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/17/health/research/high-doses-of-hormonesadd-to-ivf-complications.html?pagewanted=all&_r-I&.
90. M.J. Pelinck et al., Is the Birthweight of Singletons Born After IVF Reduced by
Ovarian Stimulation or by IVF Laboratory Procedure?, 21 REPRODUCTIVE BIOMEDICINE

ONLINE 245 (2010), availableat http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/20538525.
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health of the mother, ranging from memory loss to bone pain.91
Regulating In Vitro Fertilization in a manner that is consonant with
human rights and the guarantees established by the IAHR Court would
require information programs that create awareness among women
about the current harmful practices explained above. Such programs
should empower women to be fully aware and informed when
consenting to procedures that may be considered harmful practices. In
this sense, informed consent is an important requisite that should govern
the patient-IVF clinic relationship. Protecting women's sexual and
reproductive rights requires that the physical and mental health of
women be a priority. Within reproductive medicine there are clinics that
promote IVF treatments with low doses for hormonal stimulation.
Although these do not achieve the same levels of efficacy as ones using
high doses of hormonal stimulation, the probability of adverse effects
decreases and reduces the overall costs of the IVF treatment as well: the
low dose drugs are themselves less expensive, while the overall
monitoring costs drop significantly. 92 Moreover, with each unsuccessful
cycle, the cost-both in monetary and health terms-of undergoing
another treatment are lower, benefiting both mother and newborn.
B. Privacy,Autonomy, and the Positive/NegativeRight to
Form a Family
We shall now analyze what kinds of regulation would be compatible
with the right to form (or not form) a family, 93 enshrined in article 17(2)
of the Convention. First (beyond the dangers that obligatory transfer can
cause for the woman's health), this can be an unacceptable burden on
the woman's autonomy. A woman can consent to freezing the embryos,
but later regret her former desire to be a mother. In these cases,
compulsory transfer is an undue interference with her autonomy as well
as a violation of the principle of ersonal dignity in that it would mean
imposing an unwanted life plan.9
Second, it may also be the case that a man may oppose the transfer
of embryos after a couple separates, for example. In this case the
question arises of whether the ACHR recognizes the right to not be a
father. Though this issue has not yet been addressed within the Inter91. See Mroz, supra note 89.
92. Id.
93. Note that we use the term "family" to refer not only to heterosexual couples but to
same sex couples as well. Clearly, these issues can be extrapolated to all manner of different
couples and families. We use hetero-normative terminology only for the sake of clarity and
brevity.
94. See Hevia & Vacaflor, supra note 3, at 75-76; see also Glenn Cohen, The Right Not
To Be a Genetic Parent?,81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115 (2008) (analyzing the possibility of a woman
opposing the legal obligations "biological maternity" would impose on her).
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American system, it has already been discussed in other international
tribunals or high superior local courts. The European Court of Human
Rights recognized the man's right to oppose embryo transfer, that is, the
right to voluntary paternity. 95 By contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court
held, despite male opposition, that denying a woman any possibility of
having a genetic child imposes a "disproportionate physical and moral
burden on the woman," and consequently, the woman has a right to
implant preexisting embryos despite opposition. 96
In the context of the American Convention, as with compulsory
transfers to women, in principle, a regulation that prohibits men from
refusing the non-consensual use of their embryos would also be
unacceptable. In both cases, the right to form a family also includes the
right not to form one (or not to increase an existing family). Were this
not the case, the state would be imposing a life plan on the individual
that, (1) he or she does not accept, and (2) would last throughout his or
her whole life. 97
One related discussion is that of parenting after death, (i.e., the
possibility that the embryo transfer takes place after the death of the
man). Although it is certain that as a rule the male must have consented
at some point to the transfer, it is not obvious that the original consent
remains perpetually valid. In order to avoid this issue, using a testament
or a notarized declaration, couples can contractually contemplate what
course to take in the event of the death of one of the parties-it could be
the case that the woman dies and the man seeks to have the embryos
implanted in another woman's uterus; or conversely that upon his death,
the woman seeks to implant the embryos in her own, or another
woman's body. The possibility of committing oneself in advance seems
to be compatible with the ACHR because it respects autonomy as
manifested in anticipatorily declared will. 98 In the absence of such a
document, some bills and legislation allow implantation after the death
of the male, but establish a time limit during which this must occur, or
else, permit implantation such that it does not create filial ties with the
deceased. 99
95. Dickens & Cook, supra note 1, at 92 (discussing Evans v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct.
H.R. 264 (2007)).
96. CA 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani 1 IsrLR 1 [1995-96].
97. Martin Hevia & Ezequiel Spector, El derecho a no formar una familia: A prop6sito
del Fallo P. A. c/ S. A.C. s/ Medidas Precautorias, (Dec. 2011) REVISTA DE DERECHO DE
FAMILIA YDE LAS PERSONAS 230 (2011).

98. In a similar vein, the notion that a person can declare his/her will not to submit to
surgery for religious reasons, even in a matter of life or death, is also consistent with the ACHR.
See Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Naci6n [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice],
1/6/2012, Albarracini Nieves, Jorge Washington s/medidas precautorias, A. 523 XLVIII (Arg.).
99. For example in the Reform Bill on the Argentine Civil and Commercial Code of
Argentina, this term is one year. See Reform Bill on the Argentine Civil and Commercial Code
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Let us suppose that a couple decides to freeze embryos and after they
separate and the man dies. Can it be assumed that he has consented to
the transfer, even after separation? To forestall any confusion, the
couples may even contractually renounce the possibility of a change of
heart. Nevertheless, it is not obvious that the American Convention
would itself be compatible with advance contractual repudiation of
rights recognized in the Convention, such as the right to form or not
form a family (in some jurisdictions, this right may be considered an
entirely personal and inalienable right, and as such cannot be
renounced, even by contract).' 00
C. IVF, Anonymity, and the Right to Information
Another question that emerges implicitly from the IAHR Court
ruling refers to the compatibility of the rules of sperm and egg donation
with the ACHR. Specifically, the discussion pivots on whether a person
conceived through an 1VF procedure has a right to know the identity of
the donor, or whether donation should be completely anonymous. The
right to know the identity of the donor may, in turn, be either
unrestricted (that is, not subject to the fulfillment of certain
requirements or conditions) or conditional (constrained by specific
requirements, for example, judicial authorization for 'due cause' or the
possibility of danger to the health of the child). In truth, there are two
distinctive rights in play. First, the right to know that one has been
conceived using IVF treatments is at issue because parents might not
inform their child of this. Second, once the child becomes aware of
being conceived using IVF technology, her right to know or obtain
information about the donor's identity may become an issue.101 The
scope of this latter right would mandatorily include the child's access to
medical records, contact information, and other information required
from the donor and collected by gamete donor or fertility clinics.
With respect to the right to know, the discussion surrounds whether
such a right is a positive one (entailing an obligation to make this
information available) or a negative one (necessitating not im eding the
child from having access to such information, if necessary).' Eduardo
Rivera L6pez, for example, believes that the right to know should be a
of Argentina, art. 563.
100. Formally known in Spanish as derechopersonalisimo.See The UniversalDeclaration
of Human Rights, art. 16, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml
(last visited Oct. 14, 2013).
101. Eduardo Rivera L6pez, Donacidn de Gametos, Informaci6n y Anonimidad Un
Comentarioal Anteproyecto de Cddigo Civil, 13 REVISTA ARGENTINA DE TEORiA JURiDICA 1, 1-

4 (2012).
102. Id.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2013

21

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
474

FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 25

positive one, because access to information cannot depend on the good
will of the legal parents. If this were the case, in jurisdictions that
require for adopted children to have access to knowledge about their
adoption, children born from IVF procedures would not be entitled to a
similar right. This would create unequal treatment for these two
different "classes" of children (adopted and IVF). 0 3 Of course, it might
be difficult to practically implement such a positive right to knowledge
about donors because IVF regulation must be compatible with
confidentiality (this information could not be noted on a birth
certificate), but an administrative document could require the legal
parents to disclose the information.
Regarding the child's right to know the donor's identity, some
jurisdictions establish anonymity as the rule and expressly specify
exceptions, such as the need to know the donor's identity if there is a
danger to the health of the child. For example, in Europe, the French
Code of Public Health establishes anonymity for the donation of the
gametes, both for the donor(s) and for the child conceived as a result.104
In the United States there is no federal law regulating the issue.
Nevertheless, some individual states have enacted professional
directives, mostl general in nature, regarding the anonymity of the
gamete donors.
Rivera L6pez defends the child's unrestricted access to donor
information. He differentiates between the donor-parent relationship
on one hand, and the donor-child relationship on the other. The
relationship between the donor and the parents must be ruled by
contractual freedom; hence, for example, the donor can require
anonymity in the relationship with the parents and they, in turn, can
require it of the donor. The donation will not take place in the case of a
disagreement between the parties regarding the terms of the donation.
By contrast, the child cannot choose the terms under which the donation
has taken place. As Rivera L6pez explains,
The child is also a donee: s/he receives part of his/her genetic
endowment from the donor, and his/her very existence is, in part,
owed to the donor. Who the child is depends crucially on
something that belonged to the donor and on something that the

103. Id. at 3; see also Lucy Frith, Beneath the Rhetoric: The Role ofRights in the Practice
ofNon-Anonymous Gamete Donation, 15 BIOETHIcs 473, 479-80 (2001).
104. CODE DE LA SANT PUBLIQUE art. L 1211-5.
105. Some states have established that there are no rights or responsibilities between the
gamete donor and the conceived child. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-775 (West 2013); VA.
CODE ANN. § 32.1-257 (West 2013); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.14 (West 2013).
106. L6pez, supra note 101, at 1-2.
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donor has done.107
The fact that the child is unable to reject the donation-for her it is
constrained-is reason enough for the state to impose a condition upon
the donor that the child herself would reasonably have imposednamely, to know who the donor is.108 Conversely, it has been suggested
that an unconditional right might dissuade potential donors, which
would, in turn, decrease donations.' 0 9 The next question, from a rightsbased perspective, is whether the ACHR recognizes the child's right to
know and to access information about being conceived though gamete
donation.
First, the right to know the donors' identity and access information
can be based upon article 11(2) of the ACHR, which establishes that
"no one may be the object of arbitrary or abusive interference with his
private life, his family [ ..]".110 This is the case since knowing one's
genetic origins is considered an essential element of personal
development in private life and something that forms a part of one's
autonomy."' In this sense, there can be moral or health related reasons
for which a person may need, or should not experience obstacles to,
knowing her genetic origin. For example, the possibility that the donor's
genes hold a predisposition for an illness. Hence, legislation that
establishes the unrestricted anonymity of the donor or that does not
require parents to disclose the child's origin, parallel to the legislation
around adoption, constitute infractions by action or omission that
impede the individual from exercising her autonomy or developing her
personal life. Therefore the right to access information and know one's
origin should be considered an extension of the right not to be an object
of arbitrary or abusive interference in private and family life. However,
the scope of this right may only include a right to know the medical
history of the gamete donor, but not his or her identity. A duty to
disclose the identity of the donor may also be an arbitrary interference
with his or her privacy.
Secondly, despite the fact that the discussion has still not become
relevant in the Inter-American system of Human Rights, the right to
know and access information by a child conceived through gamete
donation has, in fact, already been considered in European
jurisprudence, and (albeit not explicitly) by the European Court of
107.
108.
109.
110.
22, 1969.
111.
Knowing

Id. at 3 & 5.
Id.
Id. at 4-6.
American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, art. 11, Nov.
Eric Blyth, Information on Genetic Origins in Donor-assisted Conception: Is
Who You are a Human Rights Issue? 5 HuM. FERTILITY 185-92 (2002).
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Human Rights. The case law holds that the right to know and to access
information are part of Article 8 of the European Convention of Human
Rights, which protects private and family life from interference by
public authorities.1 2
The right to know and to access information by the children
conceived through gamete donation gained some judicial protection in
the United Kingdom through Rose and Another v. Secretary of State for
Health and Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority."' In this
case, Joanne Rose's conception was the result of gamete donation, she
solicited information about the donors, and her request was
subsequently denied by the Secretary of State for Health.1 14 Judge Baker
held that the Secretary's decision constituted an arbitrary interference
into Rose's private and family life by impeding access to her genetic
origins under the terms of Article 8 of the European Convention on
Human Rights."15 In New Zealand, the paradigmatic case M v C
resolved the question of whether to maintain the anonymity of the
gamete donor in order to involve him in the guardianship of the
conceived child.16 Here the judge decided to keep a permanent record
of the donor's information in the event that this would become
necessary in a future guardianship proceeding." 7 In Canada, access to
information about the gamete donors by children remains unregulated
despite the existence of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act.1 ' 8
However, Canada's Adoption Act does contain mechanisms enabling
adoptees to find their birth parents.119 Ruling on this question in 2011,
112. Samantha Besson, Enforcing the Child's Right to Know her Origins: Contrasting
Approaches Under the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the European Convention on
Human Rights, 21 INT'L J.L. POL'Y, & FAM. 137, 150-52 (2007).
113. Rose v. Secretary of State for Health and Human Fertilisation and Embryology
Authority [2002] 2 FLR 962 147. Since this case, U.K. courts have started to pay more attention
to the principle of the best interest of the child, emphasizing this over and above the adult
interests within the relationship. See In re J (paternity) [2007] 2 FLR 26. Rose v. Sec'y of State
for Health [2002] EWHC (QB) 1593, [47]; In re D (Paternity) [2006] EWHC (QB) 3545, [3,
28], [2007] 2 FLR 26.
114. Rose v. Sec'y of State for Health [2002] EWHC (QB) 1593, [47-48].
115. Id., discussed in Eric Blyth et al., The Role of Birth Certiicates in Relation to Access
to Biographicaland Genetic History in Donor Conception, 17 INT'L J. CHILD. RIGHTS 207, 209-

10 (2009).
116. M v C ([2004] NZFLR 695. See also Michael Legge et al., A Retrospective Study of
New Zealand Case Law Involving Assisted Reproduction Technology and the Social
Recognition of "New" Family, 22 HuM. REPROD. 17, 20 (2006).
117. MvC [2004] NZFLR 695,
13, 14.
118. Vardit Ravitsky, Conceived and Deceived: The Medical Interests of DonorConceived Individuals, 42 HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, no. 1, Jan.-Feb. 2012, at 17; see also

Vardit Ravitsky, Knowing Where You Come From: The Rights ofDonor-ConceivedIndividuals
and the Meaning of Genetic Relatedness, 11 MINN. J.L. Scl. & TECH. 665,655 n.15 (2010).
119. Adoption Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 5, § 63 (Can.).
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the Supreme Court of British Columbia ordered its province to draft a
law protecting the rights of those conceived through donated gametes
and requiring that assisted fertility treatment clinics not destroy their
donor files. o Nevertheless, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
(BCCA) later overturned this decision. Here, the BCCA found that the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms does not confer a
"fundamental" positive right to "know one's past" (access information)
and, consequently, the British Columbia government is not obliged to
give it effect.121 Notwithstanding its conclusion, the BCCA did not
challenge the trial judge's reasoning about the parallelism between
gamete donation and adoption regarding the medical and psychological
need for access information about donors who are the biological
parents. 2 2
The child's right to know has also garnered protection in the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In
adoption cases, for example, the ECHR holds that the right to know is
protected by Article 8 of the European Convention under the right to
private life. Nevertheless, according to the Court, the right to private life
is not an absolute right. In Odivre v. Francia,the adopted child's right
to know was balanced against the biological mother's interest in
remaining anonymous.123 Here the ECHR held that states that are
parties to the European Convention have a "margin of appreciation"
over the possible measures taken in order to guarantee Article 8. In this
case, France did offer a system by which information could be accessed
by the adopted child through the National Council for Access to
Information about Personal Origins.124 This system allowed the
petitioner to acquire information that, though not leading directly to the
identification of the biological mother, did provide tools by which to
find her. The ECHR therefore resolved that France was not in violation
of the Convention.125 Following this notion, in Jdggi v. Switzerland, the
ECHR held that Switzerland was responsible for violating Article 8 of
the Convention by preventing the petitioner from obtaining genetic
material from his deceased putative father in order to establish
paternity. 126 On the basis of Odivre, the Court sustained that the right
to identity-understood as access to information and knowledge about
the manner of conception-is guaranteed under respect for private and
120. Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2011 CanLII 656, 328, 330-32.
121. Id. J 47-55.
122. Id. 11.
123. Odi~vre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, (2004) 38 E.H.R.R. 43.
Odivre v. France, App. No. 42326/98, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2003).
124. Id. 17.
125. Id. 49.
126. Jlggi v. Switzerland, App. No. 58757/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2006), 33.
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family life.12 7
It would seem then, on the basis of these and other European Court
rulings, that the Court progressively recognizes the child's vital interest
to her identity. In order to comply with the Convention, as a protective
baseline, the State must provide reasonable channels that guarantee this
right. Nevertheless, these reasonable channels must be carefully
balanced against the rights to privacy or autonomy of the biological
parents or legal parents. The general contours of this line of case law
can then be extrapolated to the question of identity in 1VF procedures
under the European System. Here, once again donors would have a
legitimate right to privacy or autonomy, an interest that can be
considered and carefully counterbalanced against the child's vital
interest to know one's identity as protected by Article 8 of the European
Convention. Recognizing the child's vital interest to identity may
merely consist in the State's obligation to require fertility clinics or IVF
clinics to preserve the medical history of the gamete donors. Thus,
states must, once again, guarantee that there is a system in place for
accessing information relevant to satisfying the child's vital interest in
knowing her origins.
The fact that this analysis is based on the European System of
Human Rights and comparative case law implies that nothing impedes a
similar conclusion under the Inter-American System of Human Rights.
Were the IAHR Court to consider the same case under analysis, the
European case law, and the child's vital interest in knowing her origins
and the rights to privacy and family life, the Court would likely produce
the same results for interpreting the American Convention. Given this,
the conclusions proposed, that the child's vital interest to identity takes
precedence over the right to unrestricted anonymity, would also be
applicable under the ACHR. As we suggested, however, this right may
not extend to a right to know the donor's identity, because the donor
may well be protected by her own right to privacy.
D. A PropertyandPrivacy Perspective on the Status of the Embryo

The IACHR concluded that embryos are not legal persons. While
legal systems that follow the Roman legal tradition historically
distinguish between "persons" and "things," and the right to property is
recognized in Article 21 of the ACHR, nevertheless, most jurisdictions
do not follow standards of property law when determining the status of
embryos.128 However, in a few instances courts do seem to hover

127. Id.
128. American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, art. 21, Nov.
22, 1969.
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around this type of analysis.' 2 9
If an embryo is a thing, are the woman and the man its co-owners?
In that case, just as in other cases of joint ownership, both owners would
have a right to veto possible uses of their embryos. Let us suppose that
the partners agree that they cannot retract their decision to have children
through IVF. In that scenario, could one party decide not to comply and
choose to pay damages for breaching the agreement? Or suppose that
the parties agree that either may renege, and then the man opposes
implantation. Can the woman continue with the implantation by paying
him damages? This analysis presumes that the legal regimen permits
these types of contracts. If it concerns a married couple, for example, in
some jurisdictions contractual agreements between spouses are entirely
prohibited, a fact which would impede the celebration of this type of
agreement.130 Another possibility is that these types of contracts, when
permitted, might instead be contracts in which non-compliance is not an
option, that is, contracts for which the courts may require the debtor to
fulfill her obligation.' 3 1
Furthermore, if the contract were not valid, could one of the parties
seek compensation for extra-contractual liability based on the
frustration of the reasonable expectations generated by the other party's
consent to the cryopreserving of their embryos? Regarding the donation
of gametes for research, if the proprietary logic is followed, may donors
revoke their donation? Generally speaking, except in situations of
ingratitude on the part of the donee, donations are contracts that must be
carried out. Donors pass ownership of the gametes to the donees. Under
the principles of property law, unless specified by a clause in the
contract, donors cannot control how their gametes are used in
research.13 2 Nevertheless, ethical considerations may require that if the
gametes are used for research using stem cells, then the donors' consent
is required, since they may have assumed that the donation would be
used for research on infertility or embryology, rather than stem cells,
which can be patented and are very lucrative.
129. In York v. Jones, the court decided that, in the absence of an agreement to the
contrary, a clinic could not refuse to send embryos frozen by the couple and deposited at the
clinic to an out of state location. York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 426 (E.D. Va. 1989), cited in
Dickens & Cook, supra note 1, at 93.
130. See, e.g., Cod. Civ. art. 1358 (Arg.) (prohibiting a married couple from entering into a
real estate contract); Cod. Civ. arts. 1807, 1820 (Arg.) (prohibiting a married couple from
entering into donative contracts).
131. Cdmara Nacional de Apelaciones en 1o Civil [CNApel.C] [National Court of Federal
Civil Appeals], Sala J, 13/09/2011, "P., A. v. S., A. C.," Abeledo Perrot no. 1/70071776-9, slip
op.
132. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 437 F. Supp. 2d 985, 1000 (E.D. Mo. 2006), cited in
Dickens & Cook, supra note 1, at 93.
133. See Dickens & Cook, supra note 1, at 93.
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Now, the fact that embryos might legally be considered "things"
does not mean that people would be free to dispose of them as they
wish: legal systems generally include several restrictions to the exercise
of property rights over things. 134 For example in the Continental
tradition, followed by most Latin American countries, there is a general
prohibition against the abuse of rights-which forbids exercising rights
in a way contrary to the spirit of the law that recognized those rights.' 35
So, for instance, it may well be that the property right over embryos
may not be exercised abusively: embryos may not be capriciously
destroyed. Moreover, some uses of the embryos might be expressly
forbidden by law (buying and selling them) or legislation may set time
limits for preservation (by reference to the age of ova's donors, say,
their fiftieth or fifty-fifth birthday). 13 6 In Brazil, for instance, the Federal
Council of Medicine prohibits the destruction of embryos, though it
does allow their cryopreservation and selection.1 37 In 2005, a federal
law, known as the "Law of Biosecurity," was finally passed in Brazil. It
allows for and regulates medically or therapeutically motivated research
on: stem cells, embryonic cells, non-viable embryos, and embryos that
had been cryopreserved for more than 3 years-all obtained through in
vitro fertilization.138 In the United Kingdom, Section 14(4) of the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Act 1990 provided that: "The
statutory storage period in respect of embryos is such period not
exceeding five years as the licence may specify."
IV. CONCLUSION

The IAHR Court admonished Costa Rica to promptly regulate IVF
procedure on the basis of the principles established in the decision and
in the Convention in a manner that the people who sought the treatment
would have access. But the implications of the case are much greater.
First, all the States parties to the ACHR must adjust their legislation and
policies according to the principles defended by the Court in "Artavia
Murillo," especially the rights to: privacy, form or not form a family,
134. See Susan R. Ackermann, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85
COLUM. L. REv. 931, 931-32 (1985) (explaining the rationale for the many restrictions on
transferability, ownership, and use of property).
135. See, e.g., Civil Code of Quebec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, arts. 6,7 (Can.); Cod. Civ. art. 1071
(Arg.).
136. See Dickens & Cook, supra note 1, at 92.
137. Resolution no. 1358/1992, Consejo Federal de Medicina [Federal Council of
Medicine], Sec. I D. 0. U. 16053 (Nov. 19, 1992), availableat http://www.portalmedico.org.br/
resolucoes/CFM/1992/1358 1992.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2013).
138. Law no. 11.105, Politica Nacional de Biosseguranga [National Biosafety Policy], § I
D. 0. U. 1, Mar. 28, 2005.
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avoid discrimination, as well as all others recognized by the
international system of human rights, such as the right to health and the
right to identity.' 39
Secondly, the Court's conclusions go beyond regulating IVF
procedures. The Court's conclusions are decisive in the serious debates
that have taken place in Latin American courts, especially around the
legalization of abortion and access to Emergency Contraception (EC).
As we have suggested, the Court's interpretation holds that the
American Convention accommodates the notion that legislations
permitting abortion are compatible with the Convention because the
right to life is not absolute (according to the Court, no right recognized
in the Convention is absolute; recognizing absolute rights would be
contrary to the purpose of the ACHR); thus, a woman's right to privacy
may outweigh the right to life. The same argument can be made for the
legal status of emergency contraception. Even if it were mistakenly
assumed that ECs do interrupt pregnancy, this could not in itself lead to
the conclusion that EC should be prohibited, because neither the right to
life nor any other right is recognized as absolute by the ACHR-a
woman's right to privacy may carry more weight. In conclusion, as of
this IACtHR ruling, the principal arguments defended by EC detractors
are now conclusively not compatible with the Court's definitive
interpretation of article 4.1.140
Third, it would be a mistake to think that adapting legislation to the
mandates of the Convention is the exclusive domain of the Legislative
Branch, or to regulation dictated by the Executive Power according to
whatsoever is established by each country's Constitution. Until such
adjustment is made, it is the responsibility of the Judicial Power in each
country to adapt its decisions involving access to and regulation of IVF
to the principles developed by the Court in "Artavia Murillo," whether
through concrete cases filed in the courts or in abstract cases-such as it
occurs in countries like Chile or Colombia where abstract cases can be
filed in Constitutional Court. In fact, the IAHR Court has stated
recently that "when a State has ratified an international treaty such as
the American Convention, its judges, as part of the State, are also bound
by such Convention. This requires judges to ensure that all the
provisions embodied in the Convention are not adversely affected by
the enforcement of laws contrary to its purpose, or which have
improperly interpreted. In other words, the Judiciary must exercise a
sort of "conventionality control" between the domestic legal provisions
which are applied to specific cases and the American Convention on
139.
140.

Jdggi v. Switzerland, App. No. 58757/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. 33 (2006).
For a discussion, see Martin Hevia, The Legal Status of Emergency Contraceptionin

Latin America, 116 INT'L J. GYNAECOL. OBSTET. 87 (2012).
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Human Rights."l 41 The courts can pressure the competent authorities to
expedite such legislation as is consonant with the Convention. During
the lapse prior to adapting the legislation to the Convention's principles,
the role of human rights lawyers is fundamental: when litigating IVF
and reproductive rights claims, they must be vigilant in reminding the
courts about the existence of the principles developed by the IAHR
Court in "Artavia Murillo."

141. Almonacid Arellano v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, T 124 (Sept. 26, 2006).
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